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INTRODUCTION
Should a good patent be deemed invalid because it is not perfect?1
Assume the good patent satisfies all the important elements of
patentability: it claims novel,2 nonobvious,3 and patent-eligible4 sub-
ject matter; sufficiently discloses the claimed invention at the time
of application;5 contains embodiments that enable a skilled artisan
to practice the invention;6 and discloses the best version of the
invention.7 The good patent’s only imperfection resides in a slightly
imprecise term.8 But the imprecision does not cause demonstrable
confusion about the scope or content of the invention claimed.9 The
perceived defect appears entirely without real-world consequence.10
Invalidating such a good patent for inconsequential imperfection
seems unadvisable.11 No deterrence rationale justifies allowing such
1. Cf. Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“[W]e protect the inventive contribution of patentees, even when the drafting of their patents
has been less than ideal.”).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
3. Id. § 103.
4. Id. § 101.
5. Id. § 112.
6. Id. § 112(a).
7. Id. But see id. § 282(b)(3)(A) (specifying that an assertion of insufficient disclosure of
best mode no longer represents an invalidity defense even as it remains a requirement for is-
suance).
8. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002)
(finding some modicum of uncertainty “as the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for
innovation”); Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 120, 124 (1873) (finding that “every rea-
sonable doubt” should be resolved in favor of the patentee).
9. Patentability requires definite claims so that inventors neither accidentally infringe
nor avoid innovating by over-estimating the monopoly asserted. See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94
U.S. 568, 573 (1876).
10. In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. (Teva II), which provides the focus
of this Note, an inconsequential defect proved outcome-determinative in an assessment of
patent validity. See 876 F. Supp. 2d 295, 400-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding patents valid despite
theoretical indefiniteness), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1363, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding patents invalid
as indefinite), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 831, 836 (compelling deferential review for district court
subsidiary fact-finding related to claim construction), remanded to 789 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (finding patents invalid as indefinite without locating clear error in district court
subsidiary fact-finding).
11. See David L. Schwartz, Retroactivity at the Federal Circuit, 89 IND. L.J. 1547, 1549,
1556 (2014) (noting that judicial parsing of semantic differences encourages patent
prosecutors to waste considerable time considering a judicial readership in addition to an
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insubstantial error to be fatal.12 Nonetheless, in the course of in-
fringement litigation, such a minor defect might lead a court to
invalidate the good patent as indefinite.13 
Providing the statutory hook for definiteness jurisprudence, the
law requires a valid patent to contain “one or more claims particu-
larly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.”14 When
invoking indefiniteness as an invalidity defense, an accused
infringer may escape liability by arguing that the claim language
appears ambiguous and by convincing the court to invalidate the
patent at issue.15
Historically, courts tended to invalidate a patent as indefinite
only if a claim term proved insusceptible to construction—meaning
the evidence in the record failed to enable the court to discern how
a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) would interpret the
disputed claim language.16 As claim construction jurisprudence
tolerates some imprecision, the good patent would not be felled by
innovative readership, and discussing the dampening effect of invalidation for insignificant
drafting errors, which render inventors disinclined to invest in patenting given its unpre-
dictability).
12. In fact, patent law permits the court to correct certain obvious errors in the course of
claim construction so as to avoid invalidating such good patents. See, e.g., CBT Flint Partners,
LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 654 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (viewing the erroneous phrase
“detect analyze” as reasonably corrected by placing “and” between the two verbs or by deleting
one of the verbs); Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1352-
53 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (reversing the district court’s decision to refrain from adding a comma
between fluorine and chlorine).
13. See infra Part II.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Imagine a pharmaceutical patent claims an “enhanced combination” of two active ingredients,
and the patent owner argues that the court should construe the phrase as indicating a
“synergistic” effect. For a case upon which this example is loosely based, see Andrulis Pharm.
Corp. v. Celgene Corp., No. 13-1644(RGA), 2015 WL 3978578, at *3 (D. Del. June 26, 2015),
aff’d, 2016 WL 3755929 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2016) (mem). The defendant might succeed in
invalidating the patent as indefinite by arguing that the phrase remains susceptible to several
other equally reasonable but contradictory interpretations, preventing the court from locating
a consistent meaning for the phrase. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (formalizing the steps for claim construction).
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indefiniteness that operates to invalidate a patent when claim terms
cannot be construed.17 
The true threat to the good patent arises when alleged infringers
invoke indefiniteness as an invalidity defense after a court has
carefully construed a given claim term.18 This iteration of indefinite-
ness as an invalidity defense proves problematic because—when no
longer tethered to claim construction, which places great emphasis
on reading the patent from the perspective of POSA—the definite-
ness assessment may result in the invalidation of a patent on the
basis of imprecision that causes no actual confusion.19
A recent case reveals the hazards posed by permitting defendants
to raise indefiniteness as an invalidity defense following claim
construction. In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
(Teva V ), the Federal Circuit,20 on remand from the Supreme Court,
invalidated a fully functional and generally unambiguous group of
related patents because of a small, inconsequential defect.21
Although the district court did not lend legal significance to the al-
leged indefiniteness given the absence of practical effect, the
Federal Circuit assessed definiteness separate from claim construc-
tion, without discrete reference to the consequences of any error
discovered.22 Even after the Supreme Court demanded greater
deference to the district court’s subsidiary fact-finding related to
claim construction in Teva IV,23 the Federal Circuit found Teva’s
17. See Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he specification may define claim terms ‘by implication’ such that the
meaning may be ‘found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.’” (quoting
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996))).
18. Imagine the court did construe “enhanced combination” as indicating a “synergistic”
relationship between the two ingredients. See supra note 16. The defendant would then in-
voke indefiniteness to argue for invalidation by asserting that the claim remained ambiguous
despite the court’s construction. See infra Part II. 
19. See infra Part III.
20. A specialized appeals court hearing all patent appeals from federal district courts. See
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(C) (2012) (establishing the limits of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction).
21. 789 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (invalidating patents as indefinite); see id. at
1346 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (“[A] person of ordinary skill in the art of polypeptide synthesis
would infer from the use of the SEC method disclosed in the specification of the ‘808 patent
that the term ‘molecular weight’ referred to peak average molecular weight.”).
22. Id. at 1345 (majority opinion) (“The district court fact findings regarding how one of
skill in the art would understand the way in which a curve created with chromatogram data
reflects molecular weights was not clearly erroneous.”).
23. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. (Teva IV ), 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). 
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patents invalid without identifying clear error in the district court’s
fact-finding.24 
Such dissonance between the Federal Circuit and district courts
is not new.25 The frequency with which the Federal Circuit reverses
district court rulings deviates from the norm.26 For federal appeals
courts generally, the civil case reversal rate ranges from 12 to 15
percent.27 But the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate for patent cases
averages around 28 percent.28 The Federal Circuit most often
reverses district courts because of disagreements related to claim
construction.29 In fact, excluding reversals implicating claim con-
struction, the Federal Circuit’s patent reversal rate would average
only 18 percent.30 Further, reversals premised on indefiniteness of
the sort that was dispositive in Teva V averages almost 40 percent,
while claim construction reversals overall hover closer to 30 per-
cent.31
High reversal rates in patent cases on appeal have been the aim
of much scholarly inquiry.32 The commentary supplies two main
explanations for why the Federal Circuit so often reverses district
court patent rulings.33 Either the Federal Circuit has failed to
sufficiently articulate the standards for claim construction such that
district courts are unable to abide by those standards, or the
Federal Circuit has refused to grant district court rulings the
24. Teva V, 789 F.3d at 1345. 
25. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) (removing claim
construction from the province of the jury to enable vertical uniformity); cf. David L.
Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates
in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 248-49 (2008).
26. Compare David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073,
1094 fig.B (2010), with Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1172 n.46 (2010).
27. Sichelman, supra note 26, at 1172 n.46.
28. Schwartz, supra note 26, at 1094 fig.B.
29. See Sichelman, supra note 26, at 1175 fig.1 (compiling reversal rate figures from both
primary and secondary sources). But see Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and
the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1038 (2007) (criticizing
statistical methods used by those that crunch the reversal rate numbers).
30. Sichelman, supra note 26, at 1175 fig.1. 
31. See id. 
32. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 25; Schwartz, supra note 26; Sichelman, supra note 26.
33. See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1035.
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deference that information asymmetry demands.34 Both factors
converge for Federal Circuit reversals premised on definiteness.35 As
currently conceived, the requirement enables the appellate court to
reverse the lower court’s invalidity assessment without opining as
to evident claim construction errors, yielding opinions that display
only superficial deference and fail to clarify claim construction
jurisprudence.36
Unlike the other requirements for patentability, definiteness
appears inseparable from claim construction.37 Either a claim term
is not susceptible to construction, and thus the patent is indefinite,
or the claim term is susceptible to construction and the patent is
definite.38 And yet, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed definite-
ness as a conclusion of law separate from claim construction.39 By
forcing this separation, the law enables the Federal Circuit to find
no error in lower court claim construction while simultaneously
invalidating a patent as indefinite if the claim lacks “reasonable
certainty”—a phrase coined by the Supreme Court in 2014 that
continues to beg for content.40 In the context of invalidating a patent
as indefinite when competing interpretations prevent the court from
construing disputed claim language, “reasonable certainty” may
provide sufficient guidance.41 But “reasonable certainty” provides
little guidance as to how the ambiguity of claim language should be
assessed after claim construction.42
34. See id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“[T]he reviewing court must give due regard
to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”).
35. See infra Part II.
36. See infra Part III.
37. Compare infra Part II, with infra Part I.B.4.
38. See John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent
Definiteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 619 (2016) (“For some time, the Federal Circuit
had required that a claim need only be susceptible to construction and not ‘insolubly ambig-
uous’ to satisfy the definiteness requirement.” (quoting Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software,
Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated by Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014)).
39. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) (replacing
“insolubly ambiguous” with “reasonable certainty” as the phrase that pays for definiteness
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012)).
40. See infra Part III.
41. See infra Part I.A.
42. See infra Part III.
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Through a close examination of Teva, this Note argues that the
definiteness requirement should rarely be deployed to invalidate a
patent for ambiguity following claim construction.43 If ambiguity
remains, then the court failed to properly construe the disputed
language.44 To support this conclusion, Part I overviews the role of
invalidity defenses in patent litigation to show how claim construc-
tion appears distinct from a court’s evaluation of enablement, antici-
pation, and written description, but remains identical with an
assessment of definiteness. Part II closely examines Teva V on
remand from the Supreme Court to reveal the extent to which the
problematic aspects of definiteness jurisprudence cannot be amelior-
ated by heightened deference for lower court subsidiary fact-finding.
Part III discusses the lessons learned from Teva to propose a new
test for definiteness where “consequentially ambiguous” would
replace “reasonable certainty” as the phrase that pays in order to
provide a more robust link between definiteness and claim construc-
tion. 
I. THE MECHANICS OF PATENT LITIGATION
United States law prohibits the unauthorized making, using, or
selling of any “patented invention.”45 The strategies invoked during
litigation revolve around what constitutes a “patented invention.”46
An alleged infringer will succeed if she persuades the court that her
activities do not fall within the limited number of activities protect-
ed by the patents at issue.47 Alternately, an alleged infringer will
succeed if she is able to convince the court that the patent is entirely
invalid and thus incapable of precluding her ostensibly infringing
activity.48 Typically, alleged infringers raise both defenses—
43. See infra Part III.
44. See infra Part III.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
46. See id.
47. See id. § 282(b)(1).
48. See id. § 282(b)(2). Given the defensive nature of such tactics, nonmeritorious claims
of patent invalidity abound. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz,
Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1786 fig.3
(2014). When facing an invalidity defense, patentees won on summary judgment in district
courts at a rate of 26 percent despite the fact that a patentee’s burden for summary judgment
in the face of an invalidity assertion is very high. See id. at 1787, 1790 (“A patentee must
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asserting that the infringing product or process is not identical to
the invention claimed in the patent and asserting that, regardless
of the subject matter covered by the claims, the patent cannot pro-
tect any invention because the patent itself proves deficient.49 
One of the first steps in any patent litigation involves the patent
owner and the defendant jointly submitting a list of challenged
claim terms with each side presenting competing interpretations of
each term.50 The patent owner’s interpretation of the claim terms
must be broad enough to support the argument that the allegedly
infringing product or process falls within the scope of the claimed
invention.51 The defendant interprets claim terms more narrowly to
argue that the patent does not cover the infringing product or pro-
cess.52 The persuasiveness of the defendant’s invalidity arguments
hinges on which interpretation prevails.53
Demonstrating the delicate dance of patent litigation, a patent
owner’s interpretation of a disputed claim term may increase the
likelihood that the patent will be invalidated.54 If the court con-
show a lack of disputed issues of material fact for all elements of the claimed invention, while
the accused infringers merely need to show a lack of disputed issues of material fact for any
element of the claimed invention.”).
49. See, e.g., PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(finding a lack of written description support for broad claiming of a consumer interface where
the application described only a particular type of consumer interface as an aspect of the
invention possessed). 
50. See, e.g., Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genetech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally
terse claim language: in order to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the
claims.”).
51. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (providing the statutory basis for the “all elements” rule for direct in-
fringement, induced infringement, and contributory infringement); see also Alcon Research
Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating that “infringement exists
if at least one claim of an asserted patent reads on a product or process that the accused
infringer has introduced into the U.S. marketplace” and distinguishing “classic patent
infringement” from “an infringement inquiry provoked by an ANDA filing under the Hatch-
Waxman system”).
52. See, e.g., Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 796 F.3d 1293, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing
claim construction in the context of clinical efficacy as a functional limitation).
53. See, e.g., Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(“Claims are not enabled when, at the effective filing date of the patent, one of ordinary skill
in the art could not practice their full scope without undue experimentation.”).
54. See, e.g., Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035, 1038-39 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding written
description support for claims related to nickel alloy, which appeared unsupported by ranges
recited in the application, because the application indicated that the range should be reviewed
as approximate).
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strues the patent as covering a broad range of activities, then that
construction may strengthen the defendant’s assertions of anticipa-
tion, nonenablement, insufficient written description, or indefinite-
ness.55 Accordingly, before the court may assess patent validity, the
court must determine how to interpret disputed claim terms—the
process known as “claim construction.”56
A. Claim Construction
Patents contain two parts: the specification, followed by individ-
ual claims.57 The specification describes the invention as a whole,
providing important contextual information as a prelude to the
individual claims.58 The claims delimit the territory of the monopoly
asserted and function to put potential infringers on notice.59 Claims
particularize what is to receive patent protection.60
When engaged in claim construction, the court does not simply
choose between the patent owner’s interpretation or the defendant’s
interpretation.61 Rather, the court triangulates between opposing
55. See, e.g., Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(indicating that a patent will be invalidated if one process or composition claimed appears
anticipated even if the patent claims cover other processes or compositions).
56. See, e.g., Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272,
1285-86 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“Claim construction is often a preliminary proceeding in
the district court, before trial of infringement, validity, damages, etc. At the threshold, the
court establishes the metes and bounds of the claims that define the patent right. The
questions of claim construction are not questions of weight of evidence or credibility of
witnesses, but of the claim scope as set forth in the patent documents. Claim construction is
the interpretation of a legal document that establishes a property right that applies
throughout the nation.”), vacated sub nom. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Universal
Lighting Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015).
57. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
58. See id. § 112(a).
59. See id. § 112(b).
60. See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1876) (“The genius of the inventor ... should
not be restrained by vague and indefinite descriptions of claims in existing patents from the
salutary and necessary right of improving on that which has already been invented.”).
61. See, e.g., Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1359 n.4 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (finding no error in the lower court’s claim construction, which was “based
on the assertion that neither party argued the construction arrived at by the district court,”
because the court is not “bound by the arguments of the parties”).
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interpretations of disputed terms to determine how POSA would
understand the terms as of the effective filing date of the patent.62 
While factual conflicts traditionally fall within the purview of the
jury, the task of claim construction now resides exclusively with the
judge, even when such construction involves the resolution of issues
with “evidentiary underpinnings.”63 Delineated by the Supreme
Court in 1996, this division of labor is relatively new.64 To justify
empowering judges to engage in the fact-intensive process of claim
construction, judges and scholars compare claim construction to
judicial construction of other written instruments, like contracts or
deeds.65
Unsurprisingly, the increasing complexity of claim construction
mirrors the increasingly complex subject matter of patents.66 As
formalized in Phillips v. AWH Corp., the claim construction process
begins with judicial consideration of the “ordinary and customary
meaning” of the terms in a given claim.67 Where a claim term has
several common meanings, the judge may consult the patent
62. See id. at 1358, 1359 n.4; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (indicating that the court should construe disputed terms from the perspective of
POSA “at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent
application”).
63. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996). 
64. In the 1990s, approximately 75 percent of patent infringement cases enlisted the jury
as the fact-finder. See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 18-21
(2013). However, now that juries do not resolve fact matters related to claim construction and
infringement cases hinge on claim construction, only 2 percent of appealed district court
decisions reviewed by the Federal Circuit involve a jury. See id.
65. Teva IV, 135 S. Ct. 831, 837 (2015). The alternative—and heterodox—comparison on
offer views patent claim construction as analogous to statutory interpretation, which begs
complicated questions given that the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) does not enjoy
interpretive authority in the way that other agencies do. See Jordan Klimek, Patents as
Regulations: How the America Invents Act and the Seminole Rock Doctrine Could Change
Claim Construction After Teva v. Sandoz, 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 307, 314 (2015).
66. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1577 (2003) (describing variances in claim construction associated with mechanical, software,
biotechnological, or pharmaceutical patents).
67. 415 F.3d at 1312; see Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, Patent
Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
711, 718 (2010) (“The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp. stands as
the most authoritative synthesis of claim construction doctrine.”); Kristen Osenga, Linguistics
and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61, 66-67 (2006) (describing difficulties
inherent in “using existing words to describe a new invention” (footnote omitted)).
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specification for guidance as to the proper meaning.68 What invent-
ors intended to protect when filing the patent may also inform the
court.69 In construing claim terms, the court adopts the perspective
of POSA.70 
Operation of claim construction thus involves two categories of
evidence: intrinsic evidence—which includes the patent specification
and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) prosecution his-
tory—and extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony.71 While the
court may rely on information sources other than the claims
themselves, claim construction must not import this evidence in a
way that would limit the scope of the claim terms as written.72 As
one might imagine, relying on evidence to construe claim terms
without importing unsupported meaning into the claim terms
proves precarious.73
B. Assessing Patent Validity
All patents vetted and issued by the PTO enjoy the presumption
of validity.74 But the threshold for rebutting this presumption is
low,75 which may be by design given that patent examiners are
68. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; see Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per Azioni, 158 F.3d
1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[I]f an apparatus claim recites a general structure (e.g., a noun)
without limiting that structure to a specific subset of structures (e.g., with an adjective), we
will generally construe the claim to cover all known types of that structure that are supported
by the patent disclosure.”); Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
69. “Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and
confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to
envelop with the claim.” Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1250. 
70. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012).
71. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. But see Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1051 (viewing the
dichotomy between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence as overly simplistic and positing four
categories of claim construction evidence: intrinsic, formal extrinsic, informal extrinsic, and
informative).
72. See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
73. See Osenga, supra note 67, at 75-76 (“Where is the line between reading the claims
in light of the specification and reading in limitations from the specification? Where is the line
between using extrinsic evidence to educate the court versus to inform claim construction?...
Who is the [POSA] and how do we know what he thinks? How does one determine the
ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term?”).
74. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”).
75. See id. (specifying that “[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim
thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity” but failing to provide guidance as to
the evidentiary threshold for carrying such a burden).
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famously overworked and examine vast numbers of patents every
year, and only 2 percent of patents are ever subject to litigation.76
Accordingly, in assessing patent validity in the context of litigation,
the court never assumes that an issued patent should have been
granted.77
Once a court has completed claim construction—construing all
the terms at issue in a given patent for plain meaning or in light of
intrinsic and extrinsic evidence—the court will move on to an
assessment of patent validity.78 As the court resolves most fact
matters in the course of claim construction, the court often assesses
these requirements as matters of law and without the aid of a jury.79
Current statutory provisions enable a defendant to challenge the
validity of an issued patent in federal court on several grounds.80
The discussion that follows overviews four categories of validity
challenges to demonstrate the extent to which indefiniteness as a
validity challenge appears aberrant in its inseparability from claim
construction. First, when a defendant challenges validity by assert-
ing nonenablement, the court examines the extent to which the
claims as construed enable POSA to practice the claimed inven-
tion.81 Second, for validity challenges based on anticipation, the
court examines the extent to which the claims as construed relate
to subject matter that appeared nonnovel or obvious as of the
effective filing date of the patent.82 Third, when a defendant asserts
insufficient written description, the court compares the claims as
76. See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1507 (2001).
77. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 111 (2011) (specifying that the Federal
Circuit has long invoked “clear and convincing” as the evidentiary standard and without
interruption by Congress, but noting that “if the PTO did not have all material facts before
it, its considered judgment may lose significant force”).
78. See Anderson & Menell, supra note 64, at 11-19.
79. See id. at 23.
80. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012) (specifying that the defense of invalidity may be based
on conditions of patentability (patent-ineligible, nonnovel, or obvious subject matter) or raised
under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (nonenablement, insufficient written description, or definiteness), but
excluding best mode as grounds for a validity challenge). While representing another obscure
and fascinating corner of the patent law landscape, validity challenges based on patent-
ineligible subject matter reside outside the scope of this Note and are not discussed. See 35
U.S.C. § 101; Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (invalidating a
method-patent covering software as drawn toward an abstract idea).
81. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 112(a), 282(b)(3)(A); infra Part I.B.1.
82. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 282(b)(2); infra Part I.B.2.
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construed with the information disclosed in the specification at the
time of filing to determine whether the application demonstrated
possession of the invention as claimed in the patent.83 Finally, for
validity challenges based on indefiniteness, the court evaluates the
claims as construed for “reasonable certainty”—an ironically
indefinite task that, this Note argues, detriments the good patent
and offers evidence against an assessment of definiteness separate
from claim construction.84 What follows is a discussion of each of
these four categories.
1. Enablement
If the claims as construed by the court relate to subject matter
that the patent fails to fully enable, then the defendant will prevail
in invalidating the patent and will not be held liable for infringe-
ment.85 A valid patent must enable POSA to practice the invention
claimed without “undue experimentation.”86 Through the process of
claim construction, the court determines the subject matter claimed
by the challenged patent.87 The patent must enable POSA to make
the invention and must describe the invention’s utility, but it need
not “guarantee that the invention works for a claim to be enabled.”88
To evaluate whether the patent proves sufficiently enabling, the
court will assess all information disclosed in the patent, including
the specification’s description of the invention, the specification’s
listed embodiments, and any other enabling information disclosed
in any of the claims of the issued patent.89 The court is free to mix
and match construed claims to locate sufficient disclosure, and the
83. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 112(a), 282(b)(3)(A); infra Part I.B.3.
84. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 112(b), 282(b)(3)(A); infra Part I.B.4.
85. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 112(a), 282(b)(3)(A).
86. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see, e.g., Plant Genetic Sys., N.V.
v. Dekalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that transgenic
corn products did not infringe cell claims where a patent was found to be invalid for lack of
enablement).
87. See supra Part I.A. 
88. Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also
Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 796 F.3d 1293, 1308, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
89. See Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(“Claims are not enabled when, at the effective filing date of the patent, one of ordinary skill
in the art could not practice their full scope without undue experimentation.”).
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court analyzes the enabling impact of construed claims in the
aggregate.90
2. Anticipation
If the claims as construed by the court relate to subject matter
found to be nonnovel or obvious, then the defendant will prevail in
challenging the patent as anticipated.91 A valid patent claims a
novel and nonobvious invention.92 Patents provide a limited private
monopoly to induce further innovation, and that end is not served
by granting patents for insignificant advances.93 If one reference or
activity discloses every element of the claimed invention prior to the
patent’s priority date, then the patent should be invalidated as non-
novel.94 If several related references disclose every element of the
claimed invention, then the patent should be invalidated as
obvious.95 The court’s anticipation analysis remains distinct from
claim construction because the court evaluates whether the claims
as construed relate to subject matter fully disclosed prior to the
patent’s priority date.96
3. Written Description
While an applicant may add, subtract, or otherwise alter the
claims after the filing date, the content of the patent’s specification
90. It is not incumbent upon the inventor to enable replication in a single claim or to
identify those particular parts of the patent pertinent to enablement. See Lefstin, supra note
29, at 1055-56.
91. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2012).
92. See id. §§ 102, 103.
93. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (How. II) 248, 267 (1850) (involving patentability
of porcelain knob with metal fastening mechanism; affirming a patent was invalid where
“absence of ... skill and ingenuity” was evidenced by “the improvement [being] the work of the
skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor”). But see John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A
Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007) (noting that seemingly trivial
technological innovations may have great economic significance).
94. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (precluding patenting where a “claimed invention was patented,
described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the
public”).
95. Id. § 103.
96. See In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[O]nce an invention is in the
public domain, it is no longer patentable by anyone.” (quoting In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898
(Fed. Cir. 1986))). 
2017] INDEFINITENESS AS AN INVALIDITY DEFENSE 1417
remains unalterable after filing.97 Given that the effective filing date
serves to shield patent owners from validity challenges based on
anticipation,98 the law requires that an issued patent’s claims find
sufficient written description support in the application relied on for
priority.99 The court will view a patent as having sufficient written
description support when the application’s specification demon-
strates possession of the subject matter covered by the patent in
light of the claims as construed by the court.100 
Demonstrating possession means enabling POSA to anticipate the
limitation later articulated in the claims.101 Even if the specific
embodiments of the invention disclosed in the application do not
suggest the claim limitation, the patent will be upheld as valid if the
application otherwise enabled POSA to anticipate the limitation
later articulated in the claims.102 Unlike the court’s evaluation of
definiteness, the written description assessment requires the court
to engage in a task separate from claim construction—namely,
comparing the challenged claims as construed to the description of
the invention offered in the specification.103
97. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (allowing for amendments to the claim language but prohibiting the
introduction of “new matter”).
98. See supra Part I.B.2.
99. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
100. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (requiring the application relied on for priority to “reasonably convey[ ] to those skilled
in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date”);
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (indicating that
actual possession does not suffice and requiring the specification to communicate possession);
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
101. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
102. See, e.g., Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (en banc) (“[A] patent claim is not necessarily invalid for lack of written description just
because it is broader than the specific examples disclosed.”); LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res.
Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (indicating that a patent should “not be
invalidated on section 112 grounds simply because the embodiments of the specification do
not contain examples explicitly covering the full scope of the claim language”).
103. See, e.g., Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1358-61 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (invalidating a patent as lacking sufficient written description when a claim covered
“macrocyclic lactone analogs” and the specification disclosed rapamycin analogs “that bind
FKBP12 and possess the same pharmacologic properties as rapamycin” because, while the
latter included the former, the pool of potential analogs proved too numerous for POSA to
discern that the patent owner possessed “macrocyclic lactone analogs” at the time of filing).
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4. Definiteness
To be valid as definite, a patent must “conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the [applicant] ... regards as his invention.”104 During
the patent application process, the PTO finds a claim indefinite if it
appears “amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions.”105
Until 2014, the Federal Circuit embraced an indefiniteness thresh-
old higher than that of the PTO, finding a patent invalid as indefin-
ite only if a claim proved “insolubly ambiguous”—a test that would
not invalidate a patent where a claim term appeared susceptible to
more than one plausible construction so long as one construction
appeared most plausible.106 Before 2014, the Supreme Court deemed
a patent invalid as indefinite when a claim resided in “[a] zone of
uncertainty.”107 Then, in 2014, the Court announced a new test for
definiteness,108 wherein a patent would be invalid as indefinite in
the event that a claim “fail[ed] to inform, with reasonable certainty,
those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.”109
Notably, unlike the other requirements, the court’s evaluation of
definiteness appears identical with claim construction.110 The
definiteness test does not require the court to engage in a compara-
tive task, which renders definiteness distinct from other varieties of
validity assessment. The court’s assessment of enablement involves
104. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
105. Ex parte Miyazaki, No. 2007-3300, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207, 1211 (BPAI Nov. 19,
2008).
106. Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d. 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(finding a claim to be “insolubly ambiguous” when “no narrowing construction can properly
be adopted”). Some scholars and commentators believe the “insolubly ambiguous” standard
was too permissive of indefiniteness. See, e.g., Sanjeev Mahanta, Indefiniteness, 54 IDEA 479
(2012).
107. United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942).
108. As the Federal Circuit pointedly stated on remand in Biosig Instruments, Inc. v.
Nautilus, Inc., “The Court has accordingly modified the standard by which lower courts
examine allegedly ambiguous claims; we may now steer by the bright star of ‘reasonable
certainty,’ rather than the unreliable compass of ‘insoluble ambiguity.’” 783 F.3d 1374, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
109. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).
110. The “reasonable certainty” test for definiteness is conditioned on the decipherability
of the claim at issue “read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the
prosecution history,” which sounds like a recitation of what constitutes claim construction.
Biosig, 783 F.3d at 1379 (quoting Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124); see supra Part I.A.
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the distinct task of assessing whether the patent enables POSA to
make and use the subject matter to which the claims as construed
relate.111 Likewise, the court’s assessments of anticipation and
written description involve distinctly comparative tasks—wherein
the court evaluates the extent to which the claims as construed
relate to subject matter already in the public domain as of the
priority date or relate to subject matter not sufficiently disclosed in
the application.112 Meanwhile, current definiteness jurisprudence
permits the court to assess residual ambiguity following claim
construction for “reasonable certainty,” which begs the question: If
uncertainty remains following claim construction, perhaps the
conclusions drawn during claim construction require reexamination
and not the claims themselves?113
II. LESSONS FROM TEVA V. SANDOZ
Teva followed the typical path of patent litigation. A brand name
drug company, Teva, held several product-by-process patents cover-
ing Copaxone, a multiple sclerosis medication.114 Several generic
drug companies, Sandoz among them, sought to manufacture and
market generic versions of Copaxone before Teva’s patent term
expired, and Teva sued for patent infringement.115 The generic
companies defended against the infringement allegation by claiming
that Teva’s patents were invalid as indefinite.116
The nine patents at issue in Teva contained the same specifica-
tion—describing the manufacturing process for Copaxone—and each
contained individual claims detailing every element of the manufac-
turing process that should be considered by other drug manufactur-
ers as the patented invention not to be infringed.117 “Molecular
weight” represented the contentious phrase the litigants called on
the district court judge to construe.118 Both sides presented conflict-
111. See supra Part I.B.1. 
112. See supra Parts I.B.2-3. 
113. See infra Part II.A. 
114. Teva IV, 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 835-36.
117. Id.; see also Teva II, 876 F. Supp. 2d 295, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); supra Part I.
118. Teva IV, 135 S. Ct. at 835.
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ing evidence as to the meaning of “molecular weight” as used in
Teva’s patents.119
The District Court for the Southern District of New York enlisted
both intrinsic evidence and extrinsic evidence to construe the phrase
“molecular weight” from the perspective of POSA with specialized
knowledge of pharmaceutical manufacturing.120 In addition to
reviewing the patents’ specification, claims, and prosecution
histories, the district court heard expert testimony offered by both
parties.121 Sandoz claimed that “molecular weight,” as used in Teva’s
patents to describe the active ingredient, copolymer-1, yielded
equally to three competing constructions: “peak average molecular
weight,”122 “number average molecular weight,”123 and “weight
average molecular weight.”124 Teva argued that “molecular weight,”
in the context of the patent, could only mean “peak average molecu-
lar weight.”125 The district court agreed with Teva and construed the
phrase “molecular weight” as “peak average molecular weight.”126
When first reviewing Teva on appeal from the district court, the
Federal Circuit granted no deference to the district court’s conclu-
sions as to the meaning of “molecular weight” on the grounds that
claim construction represented a matter of law to be reviewed de
novo.127 The Federal Circuit found that “molecular weight” did
indeed yield to three possible interpretations, thus finding the
patent invalid as indefinite.128 Disabusing the Federal Circuit of its
proclivity to subject all district court rulings related to claim
construction to de novo review, the Supreme Court’s subsequent
opinion in Teva IV refused to carve out a patent-specific exception
119. Id. at 836.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see also Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. (Teva I ), 810 F. Supp. 2d 578, 590-
93 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
122. Teva IV, 135 S. Ct. at 836 (indicating “molecular weight as calculated by the weight
of the molecule that is most prevalent in the mix that makes up copolymer-1”).
123. Id. (indicating “molecular weight as calculated by ... adding up the weight of each
molecule and dividing by the number of molecules”).
124. Id. (indicating “molecular weight as calculated by taking all the different-sized
molecules ... and calculating their average weight while giving heavier molecules a weight-
related bonus when doing so”).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. (Teva III), 723 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
128. Id. at 1369, 1375-76.
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to Rule 52(a)(6), deeming subsidiary fact-finding related to claim
construction as a fact matter to receive deferential, clear error
review.129 Meanwhile, claim construction itself remains a matter of
law.130 After Teva IV, separating subsidiary fact-finding from claim
construction appears to hinge on whether the fact derives from
intrinsic evidence or extrinsic evidence.131
Say a patent claim contains the phrase “leather chair.” If the
district court uses plain meaning or intrinsic evidence to define the
words “leather” and “chair” to then construe the meaning of the
phrase “leather chair,” then the court’s entire decision-making
qualifies as a matter of law subject to de novo review.132 If the court
relies on expert testimony to construe “leather” as “cow hide” and
“chair” as “elevated seat with four legs,” then such subsidiary
findings should be subject to deferential review as factual conclu-
sions.133 But, when the court subsequently concludes that POSA
would read “leather chair,” as used in the patent, to mean “elevated
seat with four legs covered in cow hide,” such a subsequent conclu-
sion remains a matter of law subject to de novo review on appeal.134
Unfortunately, “molecular weight” presents a far harder case
than “leather chair.”135 Even still, the Supreme Court’s instructions
in Teva IV appeared to indicate that the Federal Circuit must find
clear error in the subsidiary fact-finding that supported the district
court’s construction of “molecular weight” as “peak average molecu-
lar weight” in order to find Teva’s patent invalid as indefinite.136 The
129. Teva IV, 135 S. Ct. at 841.
130. Id. at 838.
131. See id.; Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1,
4 (2000) (categorizing Federal Circuit claim construction jurisprudence as hypertextualism
versus pragmatic textualism).
132. See Teva IV, 135 S. Ct. at 840-41.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. The construction of “leather chair” as “elevated seat with four legs covered in cow
hide” cannot hold a candle to the district court’s construction of “molecular weight” as “peak
molecular weight detected using an appropriately calibrated suitable gel filtration column.”
Teva I, 810 F. Supp. 2d 578, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding followed Markman hearings). 
136. “We have previously pointed out that clear error review is ‘particularly’ important
where patent law is at issue because patent law is ‘a field where so much depends upon
familiarity with specific scientific problems and principles not usually contained in the
general storehouse of knowledge and experience.’” Teva IV, 135 S. Ct. at 838 (quoting Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950)).
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Supreme Court conceded that distinguishing fact and law presented
a challenge in the patent context, but did not view the obstacle as
insurmountable:
[I]f a district court resolves a dispute between experts and
makes a factual finding that, in general, a certain term of art
had a particular meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art
at the time of the invention, the district court must then conduct
a legal analysis: whether a skilled artisan would ascribe that
same meaning to that term in the context of the specific patent
claim under review....
...This ultimate interpretation is a legal conclusion. The
appellate court can still review the district court’s ultimate
construction of the claim de novo. But, to overturn the judge’s
resolution of an underlying factual dispute, the Court of Appeals
must find that the judge, in respect to those factual findings, has
made a clear error.137
Nonetheless, as discussed in depth below, the Federal Circuit found
Teva’s patents indefinite for a second time on remand without
locating clear error in the district court’s subsidiary fact-finding.
A. Teva on Remand
Not long before issuing Teva IV, the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. announced a new test for
definiteness.138 Prior to Nautilus, the Federal Circuit found a claim
indefinite if the claim, as construed by the court, proved “insolubly
ambiguous.”139 Nautilus granted the Federal Circuit more leeway in
evaluating definiteness.140 Now, any claim that “fail[ed] to inform,
with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope
of the invention” might be classified as indefinite.141 
137. Id. at 841. 
138. 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).
139. Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(categorizing a claim as “insolubly ambiguous” when “no narrowing construction can properly
be adopted”).
140. See Mahanta, supra note 106, at 511.
141. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124. 
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“Reasonable certainty” is a phrase that begs for content, and the
Federal Circuit happily exploited that deficit in deciding Teva V.142
After declaring that the district court made no clear error in fact-
finding efforts that supported the construction of “molecular weight”
as “peak average molecular weight,” the Federal Circuit simply
stated that “there is not reasonable certainty that molecular weight
should be measured using [peak average molecular weight],” and
thus held the patent invalid as indefinite.143 By finding no clear
error in the district court’s subsidiary fact-finding, the Federal
Circuit implicitly affirmed that POSA would construe “molecular
weight” as “peak average molecular weight.”144 Then, in holding the
patent invalid as indefinite, the Federal Circuit carved out a brave
new world wherein a patent can somehow fail to specify the claimed
invention with reasonable certainty even though no skilled artisan
would perceive the alleged ambiguity supposedly giving rise to such
uncertainty.145
Neither Teva’s patents themselves nor their prosecution history
evidenced procedural perfection.146 The curve values offered in a
figure accompanying one patent did not match the range offered in
a particular patent claim, but an expert reasonably testified to the
fact that a skilled artisan would understand that chromatography
caused the peak curves to shift.147 The prosecution history for
another Teva patent exhibited a small degree of carelessness.148
Prior to issuing the patent, the PTO asked for clarity on the phrase
“molecular weight,” and Teva specified “weight average molecular
weight,” contradicting Teva’s claim at trial that POSA would read
142. Even if “insolubly ambiguous” remained the standard, the Federal Circuit may still
have found the claims at issue indefinite while simultaneously finding no clear error in the
district court’s fact-finding—the already tortured logic would just have been a bit more
tortured. Cf. Mahanta, supra note 106, at 511.
143. Teva V, 789 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
144. See id. After all, that is the way the district court resolved the fact matter. Teva II, 876
F. Supp. 2d 295, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
145. See Teva V, 789 F.3d at 1345 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
146. Teva I, 810 F. Supp. 2d 578, 588-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding followed Markman
hearings).
147. Id. at 589 (“[A] person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that any
discrepancy between the peak values read from the chromatogram (7.7 kDa and 12.0 kDa)
and the peak of Figure 1 is merely a by-product of the process by which the data from the
chromatogram would have been used to generate Figure 1.”).
148. See id.
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“molecular weight” as “peak average molecular weight.”149 But
testimony at trial supported a finding that Teva’s response to the
PTO was accidental error.150 And the district court determined that
any skilled artisan reviewing the patents at issue and their
prosecution histories would recognize Teva’s response as careless
error and not as grounds for confusion.151
B. Teva’s “Good” Patents
Teva’s missteps were minor, and the perfect should not be the
enemy of the good.152 If a patent is one that properly delimits the
claimed invention and puts the innovative community on proper
notice of infringement, then, as a public policy matter, the patent
should be valid.153 The district court found that Teva’s patent
enabled replication without undue experimentation.154 Accordingly,
even if some inventor found herself reasonably uncertain as to the
meaning of “molecular weight,” her confusion would not prevent her
from perceiving the scope of the claimed invention—her confusion
would not have the effect of leading her to accidentally infringe.155
The Federal Circuit could not hope to encourage more effective
patenting with this decision because Teva’s patents included claims
definite enough to delimit the scope of the claimed invention so as
to prevent infringement.156 Maybe the Federal Circuit aimed to
encourage inventors to exercise tremendous care so that future
patents would not be voided on the basis of an error no scientist
would interpret as meaningful, but to which the court might imbue
overriding significance.157 Maybe the Federal Circuit aimed to
149. Teva V, 789 F.3d at 1346-47 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1346.
151. Id. at 1347 (“Teva’s statement that the use of kilodalton units implied that ‘molecular
weight’ meant weight average molecular weight was a non sequitur and, as the district court
correctly found, a skilled artisan would not have relied upon it.”).
152. See Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 120, 124 (1873).
153. See Giordana Mahn, Keeping Trolls Out of Courts and Out of Pocket: Expanding the
Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1245, 1246-47 (2014).
154. Teva II, 876 F. Supp. 2d 295, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
155. See id. at 383 (“The testimony of the experts at trial established that the relevant level
of skill in the art was high.”). 
156. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 1549.
157. See supra note 12; see also Vederi, LLC v. Google, Inc., 744 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
2014); Elbex Video, Ltd. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 508 F.3d 1366, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
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admonish patent examiners for accepting as satisfactory responses
to definiteness inquiries that prove scientifically erroneous upon
close inspection.158 Maybe the Federal Circuit aimed to discourage
the Supreme Court from altering the Federal Circuit’s patent
validity jurisprudence by wielding the Nautilus definiteness test as
a weapon that enabled covert de novo review of fact-finding
attendant to claim construction.159
Notwithstanding the Federal Circuit’s historic power struggles
with the PTO and the Supreme Court,160 voiding patents on the
basis of technical imperfection undermines the public utility of
United States patent law.161 Patents should be valid if fully
functional.162 As currently conceived, the definiteness requirement
cuts against the public interest by allowing judicial assessment of
patent validity to hinge on insignificant error.163
III. THE FUTURE OF INDEFINITENESS
Many scholars blame claim construction for high reversal rates
on appeal in patent cases.164 A large majority of Federal Circuit
reversals implicate claim construction issues.165 Claim construction
as the root cause makes intuitive sense given that district courts
engage in claim construction in a manner vastly different from the
Federal Circuit.166 Notably, indefiniteness represents the largest
(finding error in prosecution history not dispositive where statement was submitted after
corrected error).
158. But see Schwartz, supra note 11, at 1549.
159. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 519 (2010); Arti K. Rai, Essay, Patent Validity Across the Executive
Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1238-40 (2012).
160. See Duffy, supra note 159, at 519; Rai, supra note 159, at 1238-40.
161. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 1549.
162. See id.
163. See Sichelman, supra note 26, at 1161-63.
164. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1746-48 (2009). But see, e.g., Lefstin, supra note
29, at 1038-39.
165. Sichelman, supra note 26, at 1175-76; see also Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court
Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8-10 (2001).
166. Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1051 (“In the course of deciding whether to admit evidence,
the trial judge examines that evidence. Though the evidence may eventually be denied
admission, the trial judge’s exposure to the evidence may influence his or her understanding
of the claim language.”).
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category of adjudicatory challenges to patent validity, outpacing
nonobviousness and novelty, which also follow from claim construc-
tion.167 Accordingly, definiteness jurisprudence, rather than claim
construction, may deserve the blame for high reversal rates.
A. Claim Construction Is Not the Problem
If claim construction deserves the blame, then Teva IV presented
an excellent solution to the high reversal rate problem.168 By
demanding that the Federal Circuit give greater weight to well-
reasoned, fully-informed district court decisions about how to
construe a claim, Teva IV explicitly remedied any potential imbal-
ance between deference and information asymmetry.169 By limiting
the Federal Circuit’s ability to issue reversals based on de novo
review, Teva IV encouraged the Federal Circuit to clarify claim
construction jurisprudence by requiring an exposition of any clear
error perceived.170
Yet, on remand in Teva V, the Federal Circuit found Teva’s
patents invalid as indefinite without locating clear error in the
district court’s subsidiary fact-finding.171 The alchemy on display by
the Federal Circuit in Teva V demonstrates why increased deference
for subsidiary fact-finding is unlikely to solve the incongruity in
claim construction between district courts and the Federal Circuit,
and begs the question: Is claim construction really the problem?
Claim construction attendant to a judicial assessment of definite-
ness contributes to the Federal Circuit’s high reversal rate.172
Accordingly, retooling the definiteness test may lessen the reversal
rate problem. More importantly, the unpredictability of judicial
assessment of patent definiteness means that the test for definite-
ness must be retooled if the requirement is to remain useful and
legitimate as an essential element of patentability.173
167. See Allison, Lemley & Schwartz, supra note 48, at 1782. 
168. Cf. Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1050-51.
169. Cf. id. at 1050.
170. Teva IV, 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). 
171. Teva V, 789 F.3d 1335, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
172. See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1050-51.
173. See Mahanta, supra note 106, at 511.
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The definiteness test will remain broken if it continues to stand
in isolation from all other elements of patentability.174 Such reifying
of definiteness led the Federal Circuit in Teva V to lose sight of why
the court should care about indefiniteness.175 Patents do not
distinctly point out claims to honor the ideal of definiteness; patents
distinctly claim to prevent infringement and to limit the scope of the
monopoly claimed so that other innovators are not wrongly re-
stricted.176 Congress never intended for definiteness to stand in
isolation from all other elements of patentability.177
B. “Consequentially Ambiguous”
To bring definiteness out of isolation, a pragmatic test might
replace “reasonable certainty” with “consequentially ambiguous.” In
Teva V, the Federal Circuit held that, because “molecular weight”
theoretically yielded to three possible meanings, the patent claim
remained reasonably uncertain, rendering the patent invalid.178
Theoretical uncertainty invalidated the patent even though the
district court determined that POSA would easily resolve any
theoretical ambiguity by drawing on knowledge of the field.179 The
district court’s subsidiary fact-finding would support a conclusion
that the phrase appeared inconsequentially ambiguous.
Accordingly, “consequentially ambiguous” might achieve Teva
IV ’s deference aspirations by more forcefully compelling the Fed-
eral Circuit to give more weight to well-reasoned fact-finding by the
district court.180 While a theoretical estimation of uncertainty
allowed the Federal Circuit to disregard subsidiary fact-finding,
district court resolution of fact matters as proof positive (or
negative) of the consequences of any perceived ambiguity should be
harder to dismiss.181 Even as jurisprudence from the Federal Circuit
would provide content for what qualifies as “consequential” as a
174. Cf. Allison, Lemley & Schwartz, supra note 48, at 1788-91.
175. See Teva V, 789 F.3d at 1344-45.
176. Cf. id.
177. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 1549.
178. See Teva V, 789 F.3d at 1344-45.
179. See id. at 1346-47 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
180. Cf. Anderson & Menell, supra note 64 (discussing impact of Markman hearings on
deference and claim construction jurisprudence).
181. Cf. id.
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legal standard, fact-finding related to consequences could not be as
easily ignored as fact-finding related to theoretical uncertainty.182
In addition, with a focus on consequence rather than theoretical
confusion, “consequentially ambiguous” might impose a burden on
the party raising invalidity as a defense to demonstrate how the
indefiniteness alleged proved consequential.183 Currently, asserting
indefiniteness as an invalidity defense proves par for the course in
patent litigation because such a defense does not require much from
the alleged infringer.184 If the defendant is required to particularize
the consequences of the ambiguity perceived, then the court need
not consider theoretical ambiguity nor even all consequences of any
alleged ambiguity.185 
The reasonably uncertain test requires the court to double down
on hypotheticals when assessing indefiniteness.186 As discussed, the
court engages in claim construction to evaluate what a given claim
term would have meant to POSA at the time of the patent applica-
tion.187 Subsequently, the court estimates if the patent as construed
would carve out the scope of the invention claimed in a “reasonably
certain” manner.188 How POSA might perceive the scope of a given
innovation is far more illusive than how POSA would perceive a
claim term like “molecular weight.”189 Moving definiteness from the
hypothetical realm back into the real world should provide a
solution. After all, in the context of infringement litigation, the
defendant is not a hypothetical POSA alleging invalidity on behalf
of all other hypothetical POSAs.190
If the party raising indefiniteness as a defense had to specify how
POSA would misunderstand the scope of the invention given the
182. Cf. id.
183. A safe assumption given that the standard would clarify how exactly “clear and
convincing” is context dependent for the burden of persuasion regarding an invalidity defense
premised on indefiniteness. Cf. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 111 (2011).
184. Cf. id.
185. Just as courts rely on the prior art references supplied by the asserting party when
an invalidity defense is premised on lack of novelty. Cf. Campbell v. Spectrum Automation
Co., 513 F.2d 932, 935-37 (6th Cir. 1975) (showing “clear and convincing” to be a burdensome
evidentiary standard for other infringement defenses).
186. See generally Teva V, 789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
187. See supra Part I.A.
188. See supra Part I.B.4.
189. See supra Parts I.B.4, II.A.
190. Cf. Campbell, 513 F.2d at 935-37.
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evident imprecision, then the court would evaluate the viability of
that allegedly reasonable misinterpretation rather than rule on how
any perceived indefiniteness might hypothetically inhibit perception
of the scope of the invention. In the Teva cases, such a test would
require Sandoz to particularize the indefiniteness defense. Sandoz
would have to demonstrate that misperceiving copolymer-1 as
having a molecular weight between five to nine kilodaltons when
“molecular weight” means “weight average molecular weight” or
“number average molecular weight” would actually lead Sandoz to
believe they might manufacture a generic version of Copaxone
without infringing Teva’s manufacturing patent. Sandoz would not
be able to offer such a particularized version of the invalidity
defense to the court—or at least not with a straight face.191 And so,
Sandoz would be unable to raise indefiniteness as a defense.192
Compelling the party that asserts an invalidity defense to
particularize the consequences of the invalidity alleged is not new.193
When an assertion of invalidity depends on demonstrating lack of
novelty, obviousness, or improper patent subject matter, the
asserting party must present more particularized evidence than is
required when an invalidity defense is premised on indefiniteness.194
Accordingly, in imposing an added burden on an alleged infringer
asserting a recognized defense, the “consequentially ambiguous” test
would not be aberrant.195 
Arguably, “consequentially ambiguous” might cut in favor of
patent holders over alleged infringers.196 And, the notorious
191. Cf. Teva V, 789 F.3d at 1346-47 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
192. Cf. id.
193. See, e.g., In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Wyer,
655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
194. See supra Part I.A.
195. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickenson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(requiring a prima facie case of patentee acting with specific intent to deceive the PTO for
alleged infringer to raise defense of inequitable conduct; supporting the contention that
insignificant error should not be outcome-determinative).
196. Courts already comment on the extent to which the presumption of validity cuts in
favor of the patent holder by placing the burden of demonstrating invalidity on the alleged
infringer. See, e.g., Campbell v. Spectrum Automation Co., 513 F.2d 932, 935-36 (6th Cir.
1975). But an invalidity defense premised on obviousness or lack of novelty requires much
more from the asserting party than does definiteness. See supra Part I.
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expense197 of patent litigation already resigns many to licensing
from patent holders even where litigation might reveal the patent
at issue to be consequentially ambiguous.198 Yet, the invalidity
defense to infringement is often raised in a context like the
above—where Goliath fights Goliath and no monetary asymmetry
induces a party to license a bad patent to avoid litigation costs.199 In
no world did Teva’s use of the phrase “molecular weight” lead
Sandoz to believe that manufacturing Copaxone did not infringe on
Teva’s patent.200 United States patent law should not allow Sandoz
to free-ride off Teva’s investment in drug development because of an
insignificant error that amounted to a typo.201 United States patent
law should not allow Sandoz to delegate the task of investigating
theoretical indefiniteness to federal district courts or to the Federal
Circuit.202 Emphasizing the absurdity, United States definiteness
jurisprudence appears out of step with patent validity standards
abroad, given that the European Patent Office recently upheld
Teva’s Copaxone patents as valid despite the typographical error.203
197. Patent infringement litigation costs an average of $650,000 for suits where less than
$1 million is at risk and an average of $2.5 million where $1 million or more is at risk. AM.
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY: 2011, at 35-36 (2011).
198. Arguably, the unpredictability of invalidations based on indefiniteness may prevent
parties from engaging in such rational calculus when doing so would be wealth-maximizing.
Cf. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1991, 1993 (2007) (describing the prospect of injunctive relief as enabling irrational pricing
of licenses).
199. Cf. id.
200. Cf. Teva V, 789 F.3d 1335, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
201. Cf. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 111 (2011).
202. Cf. Anderson & Menell, supra note 64, at 4-5; Sichelman, supra note 26, at 1165, 1168-
71.
203. See Kelly Knaub, CORRECTED: Teva Copaxone Patent Upheld as Valid by EPO,
LAW360 (Dec. 8, 2015, 9:56 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/735404/corrected-teva-
copaxone-patent-upheld-as-valid-by-epo [https://perma.cc/3DMK-Q434].
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CONCLUSION
In issuing Teva IV, the Supreme Court intended to reduce high
reversal rates on appeal in patent cases.204 Analysis of the Federal
Circuit’s patent reversal rates suggests that reversals based on
district court claim construction drive up the overall reversal rate.205
And reversals based on claim construction that informs an invalid-
ity assessment where indefiniteness proves dispositive drive up the
overall claim construction reversal rate.206 The conceptual nature of
the current test for definiteness renders problematic the task of de-
ciphering between the process of claim construction and an assess-
ment of definiteness in light of completed claim construction.207 
Many scholars and commentators view the convergence of claim
construction and definiteness as grounds for emphasizing the sig-
nificance of claim construction jurisprudence and attendant review
standards.208 But the same logic justifies an increased emphasis on
definiteness jurisprudence.209 After all, the coincidence of claim
construction and definiteness must mean that tests for definiteness
necessarily inform the operation of claim construction just as claim
construction jurisprudence dictates definiteness.210
A test like “consequentially ambiguous” would remove definite-
ness from claim construction’s theoretical realm, enabling the two
to be more easily distinguished.211 Disallowing invalidity defenses
premised on conceptual indefiniteness would limit the degree to
which definiteness is isolated from other patentability require-
ments, allow for greater deference to district court subsidiary fact-
finding, place a higher evidentiary burden on the asserting party
more consistent with the “clear and convincing” standard as re-
204. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Teva IV, 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) (No. 13-854)
(revisiting questions centered on uniformity effects).
205. See Sichelman, supra note 26, at 1173-76.
206. See id.
207. See supra Part I.B. 
208. See, e.g., Mahanta, supra note 106, at 485.
209. See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1049 (discussing unpredictable nature of indefiniteness
reversals as more important than frequency of such reversals).
210. Cf. Klimek, supra note 65, at 314 (emphasizing differences between PTO and federal
courts regarding patent validity assessment).
211. See supra Part III.B.
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quired by the presumption, and align the evidentiary standard for
indefiniteness with that of the other categories of invalidity
defenses.212
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